We consider a two-person trading game in continuous time whereby each player chooses a constant rebalancing rule b that he must adhere to over [0, t]. If V t (b) denotes the final wealth of the rebalancing rule b, then Player 1 (the "numerator player") picks b so as to maximize E[V t (b)/V t (c)], while Player 2 (the "denominator player") picks c so as to minimize it. In the unique Nash equilibrium, both players use the continuous-time Kelly rule b * = c * = Σ −1 (µ − r1), where Σ is the covariance of instantaneous returns per unit time, µ is the drift vector of the stock market, and 1 is a vector of ones. Thus, even over very short intervals of time [0, t], the desire to perform well relative to other traders leads one to adopt the Kelly rule, which is ordinarily derived by maximizing the asymptotic exponential growth rate of wealth. Hence, we find agreement with Bell and Cover's (1988) result in discrete time.
1 Introduction 1.1 Literature Review Kelly (1956) obtained the eponymous Kelly rule ("Fortune's Formula," Poundstone 2010) by maximizing the asymptotic growth rate of one's capital when gambling on repeated horse races where the posted odds diverge from the true win probabilities.
Famously (cf. with Thorp 2017) , the Kelly rule was employed by card counter Edward O. Thorp to size his bets at the Nevada blackjack tables. Thorp went on to use the same principle (of the log-optimal constant-rebalanced portfolio) in money management on Wall Street. For the general discrete time portfolio problem, the Kelly investor willingly foregoes the tangency portfolio (of maximum Sharpe ratio) in exchange for the highest possible asymptotic capital growth rate. Breiman (1961) showed that a Kelly gambler will almost surely outperform any essentially different strategy (by an exponential factor), and he has the shortest mean waiting time to reach a distant wealth goal.
In a pair articles, Cover (1980, 1988) proved a short-term optimality property of the discrete time Kelly rule. They show that the Kelly criterion emerges as the solution of a wide class of "investment φ-games" where the goal is for one investor to outperform the other (in the sense of an increasing function φ(•) of the ratio of the two players' final wealths). Both papers use an artifice whereby, before the game itself, each player is allowed make a "fair randomization" of his initial dollar, by exchanging it for any random variable distributed over [0, ∞) whose mean is at most 1.
Contribution
This paper studies a similar game in continuous time, where each player commits to a rebalancing rule that must be used continuously over the interval [0, t] . The unique Nash equilibrium (that constitutes a saddle point of the expected ratio of wealths at t) is for both players to use the continuous time Kelly rule. This result, which matches that of Bell and Cover (1988) , holds for the general market with n correlated stocks (i = 1, ..., n) in geometric Brownian motion. This being done, we show that the continuous time Kelly rule is the basis for the solution of a "continuous time investment φ-game" that is analogous to the discrete time version solved by Bell and Cover.
Model
We consider a continuous time trading game between two players. There is a risk-free bond whose price B t := e rt evolves according to dB t = rB t dt and a single stock whose price S t follows the geometric Brownian motion
where µ is the drift, σ is the volatility, and W t is a standard Brownian motion. At 
Payoff Computation
Each player's wealth follows a geometric Brownian motion
Solving, we obtain
The ratio of final wealths is
Thus, since the ratio of final wealths is log-normally distributed (cf. Shonkwiler 2013),
we have, after simplification,
After a monotonic transformation, we may re-write the payoff kernel as
which is the exponential growth rate of
Equilibrium
Player 1's best response correspondence is
Player 2's best response function is
Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is b * = c * = (µ − r)/σ 2 , which happens to be the continuous time Kelly rule (cf. Luenberger 1998). Ordinarily, the Kelly (1956) rule is derived by maximizing the asymptotic continuously-compounded capital growth rate
Hence, even over very short intervals of time [0, t], the desire to outperform other traders in the market dictates the use of the Kelly rule b * := (µ − r)/σ 2 . We have thus derived a short-term optimality property of the continuous time Kelly rule that matches the results obtained by Bell and Cover (1988) in discrete time.
Several Correlated Stocks
We extend the above result to the general stock market with n correlated stocks (i = 1, ..., n) whose prices S it follow the geometric Brownian motions (cf. Bjőrk 1998)
where µ := (µ 1 , ..., µ n ) is the drift vector, σ := (σ 1 , ..., σ n ) is the vector of volatilities, and Σ is the covariance matrix of instantaneous returns per unit time, e.g. Σ ij = Cov(dS it /S it , dS jt /S jt )/dt. The W it are correlated standard Brownian motions, with
We assume that Σ is invertible. In this context, a rebalancing rule is a vector b : 
The solution of this stochastic differential equation is
This can be verified directly by applying Itô's Lemma for several diffusion processes
Thus, the ratio of final wealths is log-normally distributed, with
After monotonic transformation, we obtain the simplified payoff kernel
where (Σc) i := n j=1 ρ ij σ i σ j c j is the i th coordinate of the vector Σc. Assuming that Σ is invertible, Player 2's best response function is
Intersecting the best responses, we find that the unique Nash equilibrium is b * = c * = Σ −1 (µ − r1), which is the multivariate Kelly rule in continuous time. We thus have the identity 
Investment φ-Game
Based on the fact that the Kelly rule b
we can obtain a general result analogous to that of Bell and Cover (1988) . First, we need some definitions. 
The random wealths W 1 and W 2 are independent of each other. Proof. First, we show that E[φ{W * 
Similarly, we show that 
, is Player 2's minimax solution of the primitive φ-game, we must have
Thus, we have shown that (W * 1 , b * ) forces the payoff to be ≥ v φ and (W * 2 , c * )
forces the payoff to be ≤ v φ when b * and c * are equal to the Kelly rule and (W *
are the minimax strategies from the primitive φ-game. This proves the theorem. To illustrate, we use the example of "Shannon's Demon" in continuous time. In
Shannon's classic discrete time example, there is cash (that pays no interest) and a "hot stock" that each period either doubles or gets cut in half in price, each with 50%
probability. The continuous time analog is to set r := 0 and
with σ := log 2 ≈ 0.693. The unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game is for both players to use the rebalancing rule b * := 0.5; the players' best response correspondences are plotted in Figure 1 . For the sake of argument, assume that Player 1 behaves correctly, but Player 2 (perhaps confused by the 24% annual drift rate) chooses to put all his money into the stock, and hold.
Player 1's wealth at t is exp(0.06t + 0.3465W t ), and Player 2's wealth at t is exp(0.693W t ). The expected wealth ratio is exp(0.12t). In Figure 2 we have simulated a single play of the game, with a horizon of T := 300. At time t, the probability that Player 1 has more wealth than Player 2 is N (0.173 √ t), where N (•) is the cumulative normal distribution function. At t := 50, there is an 89% chance that Player 1 has more wealth. At t := 100 this number rises to 96%.
The General Stochastic Differential Game
Finally, we show that the restriction to constant rebalancing rules entails no loss of generality. We do this below for the one-stock case; the proof for several stocks is similar. Let M 1t and M 2t be the wealths of the numerator and denominator player, respectively. We now allow the players' portfolios to depend on the most general is replaced by (µ − r1 − Σc) (b − c).
Conclusion
For the continuous time two-person trading game whereby Player 1 seeks to maximize the expected ratio of his wealth to that of Player 2 (and Player 2 seeks to minimize this ratio), the unique Nash equilibrium is for both players to use the (possibly leveraged) Kelly rebalancing rule b * := Σ −1 (µ − r1). More generally, we showed that the Kelly rule is the basis for the solution of a "continuous-time investment φ-game" that is the analog of the discrete time version solved by Cover (1980, 1988) . For practically any criterion φ{W 1 V t (b)/(W 2 V t (c))} of short-term relative performance, the correct behavior is for both players to use the Kelly rule b * = c * in conjunction with appropriate fair randomizations (W * 1 , W * 2 ) of the initial dollar. Thus, the continuous time Kelly rule (which is renowned for its optimal asymptotic growth rate)
is desirable even for a trader whose goal is to perform well relative to other traders over very short periods of time.
